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EDITORIAL NOTES
consumers. Of course a natural gas company may be, and often is,
a public utility as to industrial consumers, but whether in a given
case a particular natural gas company is supplying its industrial
consumers on a public basis or on a private basis, depends, it
would seem, upon the facts of the particular case, viz., whether
the gas company has held itself out to serve industrial consumers
generally, i. e., depends upon the existence of a public profession
to serve that class of applicants. But how far a classification is
permissible is a point that is not free from doubt, and, in justice
to the decision it should be said that it is perhaps possible to sus-
tain the actual conclusion reached in the principal case on the
ground that there was probably present the requisite public pro-
fession, but the Court, apparently taking the view that a public
profession as to one class of applicants is a public profession as
to the other class, does not throw much light upon the point herein
suggested.
-T. P. H.
DoEs A PROVISION THAT AN OIL AND GAs LEASE SHALL BE VOID
U._NLss THE LEssEE DRILLS OR PAYS RENTAL CREATE A CONDI-
TION?--_An important class of oil and gas leases has been termed
by some courts "unless" leases. As an example of the provision
which distinguishes "unless" leases we may take the following
clause from a lease involved in a well known case' in which the
term was five years and as long thereafter as oil or gas should be
found in paying quantities. The provision is as follows:
"Provided, however, that this lease shall become null and
void and all rights thereunder shall cease and determine unless
a well shall be completed on said premises within three months
from date hereof, or in lieu thereof thereafter the parties of
the second part shall pay to the parties of the first part fifteen
dollars for each three months delay, payable in advance, until
a well is completed."
Thus the essential feature of an "unless' lease is a provision to
the effect that the lease- shall become null and void (or shall ter-
minate) unless the lessee drills a well within a fixed period or
pays a certain sum for the privilege of delaying such drilling dur-
'Pyle v. Henderson, 65 W. Va. 39, 66 S. U. 10 (1909). A statement as to the
characteristics of an "unless' lease will be found In Northwestern Oil & Gas Co.
v. Branine, 175 Pac. 533 (Okla. 191S). The term may not be a desirable one but
it -is short and the meaning is now well known to lawyers familiar with oil and
gas litigation.
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ing such period. The lessee, however, does not covenant to do
anything. He does not bind himself to drill a well or to pay the
delay rental.2  In two recent cases 3 it was assumed without dis-
cussion that this sort of a provision in an oil and gas lease amounts
only to a condition subsequent so that if the lessee fails to drill a
well or to'pay the delay rental within the period fixed this is a
breach of the condition and gives to the lessor only a right to de-
clare a forfeiture of the lease. Consequently in each of these
cases the Court held that equity should relieve from the forfeiture
by the lessor where the lessee intended to pay the delay rentals but
failed to make payment within the time fixed.
In one of these cases4 the leased premises had been conveyed to
the plaintiff by the original oil and gas lessor more than a year
before the delay rental in question became due and the lessee was
duly notified of this conveyance. The lessee's clerk negligently
failed to note the conveyance to the plaintiff in the proper place
on the lessee's books and as a result the rental was deposited in
the proper bank to the credit of the original lessor instead of to
the credit of the plaintiff. The error was not discovered until
over two months after the delay rental was due, at which time
the rental was tendered to the plaintiff who refused it. No well
had ever been started by the lessee. The plaintiff brought suit
apparently to remove the lease as a cloud on his title. He based
his suit on the theory that the lease terminated on non-payment of
the delay rental. The lessee admitted its failure to pay the delay
rental was due to the negligence of its clerk. The Court held
that the attempt of the plaintiff to terminate the lease was in
the nature of a forfeiture and under Sec. 2844 of the Revised Stat-
utes of Oklahoma equity would relieve from such forfeiture.5
2Glasgow v. Chartiers Oil Co., 152 Pa. St. 48, 25 Atl. 232 (1892); Snodgrass
V. South Penn Oil Co., 47 W. Va. 509, 35 S. E. 820 (1900); Weaver v. Akin,
48 W. Va. 456, 37 S. E. 600 (1900); Smith v. South Penn Oil Co., 59 W. Va.
204, 53 S. E. 152 (1906).
3Brunson v. Carter Oil Co., 259 Fed. 656 (D. C., E. D. Okla. 1919) and Kays
v. Little, 103 Ran. 461, 175 Pac. 149 (1918). Some support has been given such
construction by dicta in certain cases in which the lessor tried to recover delay
rental in an action at law. Such dicta are of little value. In most of these cases
the courts evidently considered the lease involved as an ordinary lease and con-
sequently considered themselves bound by the *established law of landlord and
tenant. For cases of this sort see O'Neill v. Rtisinger, 77 Kan. 63, 93 Pac. 340
(1908) ; Glasgow v. Chartiers Oil Co., .152 Pa. St. 48, 25 Atl. 252 (1892); Snod-
grass v. South Penn Oil Co., 59 W. Va. 204, 53 S. E. 152 (1900).
"Brunson v. Carter Oil Co., supru.
OThe Supreme Court of Oklahoma has since correctly decided that an "unless"
lease terminates on failure of the lessee to drill a well fr to pay the delay rental.
It stated there is no forfeiture in such n case. See Curtis v. Harris, 184 Pao.
574 (Okla. 1919). See also Mitchell v. Probst, 152 Pac. 597 .(Okla. 1915).
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In the other case8 the lessee five days before the delay rental was
due sent a check for the amount due by registered mail to his
agent in the county in which the land was located. On the day
the rental was payable the agent called up the lessee on the tel-
ephone and told him the check had not arrived, whereupon the
lessee immediately sent another check to his agent by registered
mail. Both letters arrived three days after the money was due
and one of the checks was then deposited in the proper bank to
the lessor's credit. The Court approved the conclusion of the trial
judge "that a state of facts is presented which, in the interest of
justice, requires that a court of equity should relieve against the,
forfeiture attempted to be enforced by the plaintiff in this action."
It does not appear why the lessee did not have his agent deposiv
the twenty dollars delay rental due after the latter called the
lessee on the telephone. Apparently the sum could easily have
been paid on the day due, hence the lessee seems to have been
guilty of negligence. In the report of this case the theory on
which, the plaintiff based his suit does not appear. It is true the
lessee was engaged in drilling a well on which about $15,000 had
been spent before the rental was due but no oil had been discovered.
In the latter case the effect of the decision was to allow the
lessee three days more time in which to exercise his option to pay
the delay rental, for it is evident that the lessee could have de-
cided not to make the payment at any time before the check was
actually deposited, and the lessor would have had no remedy.
In the former case the lessee was given over two months extra
time in which to decide whether to make the payment. In the
meantime if developments on nearby land had shown the lease-
hold in question was valueless the lessee would probably not have
paid this sum of money at all but would have rejoiced in the for-
tunate mistake of its clerk. Any oil and gas lessee might be
pleased to have extra time within which to exercise such an option
at a contingent expense equal to interest at the legal rate on the
sum due for the extra time allowed. What does the lessor get
in return for this favor to the lessee? He fnds that he has no
right to take advantage of the apparent termination of the lease
as provided by its express language. He finds that, instead, the
option of the lessee is extended by judicial construction. The fact
that the lesse may have intended to exercise the option is of no
Kayz v. Little, supro.
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value to the lessor. Such intentions give rise to no liability en-
forcible against the lessee.
Is the provision in an "unless" lease a condition subsequent as
assumed by these courts or is it a special limitation? According
to the usual meaning of the language used it seems to be a special
limitation since the lease provides it shall become null and void
(or shall terminate) if the lessee does not drill a well or pay the
delay rental within the time fixed. The distinction between a con-
dition subsequent and a special limitation has been stated as
follows:7
"The principal difference between a condition and a limi-
tation is, that a condition does not defeat the estate when
broken. until it is avoided by an act of the grantor or his
heirs; but a limitation marks the period which is to determine
the estate, without entry or claim, and no act is necessary to
vest the right in him who has the next expectant interest.
Whether the particular form made use of amounts to a condi-
tion, a limitation, or a covenant merely, is a matter of con-
struction depending upon the true intent and meaning of the
contract."
According to this statement whether a provision amounts to a
condition or a special limitation must be determined from the
intent of the parties as expressed in the instrument.
There are early English cases holding that where an ordinary
lease provides that on default of the tenant in the performance of
some covenant the lease shall become void or shall terminate, this
is a special limitation and the lease ends ipso facto on a breach of
the covenant. These cases have been overruled in England and
such a provision has since been construed as a condition inserted
in the lease for the benefit of the lessor. The law of most of the
jurisdictions in this country is in accord with the latter construc-
tion.8 One reason the courts abandoned the original construction
and adopted this new one (which may seem somewhat inconsistent
with the language used) was that the former construction enabled
the tenant to terminate the lease at any time he .desired by making
a breach of the covenant, thus enabling him to take advantage of
his own wrong. Undoubtedly this construction is fully justified
wherever the provision is inserted with the purpose of preventing
'TAYLo, LANDLORD AND TENANT, 8 ed., § 273.
$See LEAKE, PROPERTY IN LAN*TD, 2 ed., 170 and TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TEN-
ANT, 1369.
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the breach of covenants by the lessee. This appears to be the
purpose wherever a breach of a covenant by the lessee is the
event stipulated as making the lease void. The courts in the two
cases under consideration, probably as a matter of course, ap-
plied this well-known construction to an "unless" oil and gas
lease disregarding the fact that the situation was not analogous.
The same construction ought not be given in case the event stipu-
lated is one which is entirely beyond the control of the lessor and
does not amount to a wrong by the lessee.
If an oil and gas lessee should covenant to drill a well within
a stated time or to pay delay rental in lieu thereof and the lease
further provided that if the lessee broke such covenant, then the
lease should terminate, a situation would be presented which
would be analogous to the one mentioned above. In other words,
had the leases involved in the two cases under consideration been
what has been termed "or'' leases and had each contained a
further provision that it should terminate on breach of the cove-
nant to drill a well or to pay delay rental, then, on failure of
the lessee to do either, the lessor could treat it as a breach of con-
dition and declare a forfeiture, or he could treat the lease as still
existing and enforce the covenant to pay the delay rental against
the lessee,10 just as a landlord in an ordinary lease with a provision
that it shall terminate on breach of a covenant by the tenant may
on breach of condition waive the forfeiture and enforce the cove-
nant against the lessee. When this provision is construed as a
condition in such a lease the construction is plainly beneficial to
the lessor. According to familiar rules equity will in proper cases
9Oil and gas leases in which the lessor affirmatively covenants either to drill
a well or to pay delay rental from time to time in lieu of drilling have been
termed "or" leases. If the lessee in such lease falls to pay the delay rental the
lessor may sue and recover such rental In an action at law. See Leatherman
v. Oliver, 151 Pa. St. 646, 25 AtI. 309 (3892) ; Cohn -v. Clark, 150 Pac. 467
(Okla. 1915); Roberts v. Bettman, 45 W. Va. 143, 30 S. E. 95 (1898).
"OAuthorities to this effect are quite numerous. See Ray v. Natural Gas Co..
138 Pa. St. 576, 20 At. 1065 (1891) and Galey v. Kellerman, 123 Pa. St. 491,
16 AtI. 474 (1889) for a statement of the law. For further cases see the col-
lection in a note in 2 ANN. CAS. 4147.
Oil and gas leases create profits and are not true leases. However, as has here-
tofore been pointed out in 25 W. VA. L. Q. 322-5. courts have been trying to
treat them as true leases and have been slow to recognize the fact that
they Are not true leases. Since there is no considerable body of law in regard
to profits (aside from so-called mineral leases) in dealing with oil and gas leases
courts ought to apply the law of landlord and tenant when 'closely analogous but
should at all times feel free to depart from it in situations where not jclosely
analogous. On the point involved in the above-mentioned cases the analogy is
almost perfect and the same rule ought to apply as is applied In the .ase of true
leases. It does not follow that this rule ought to apply to an "unless" lease.
5
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relieve from a forfeiture for condition broken.1 But in the case
of an "unless" oil and gas lease the reason for construing the pro-
vision as a condition instead of the special limitation which its
language indicates it was intended to be, fails entirely, for, on
failure by the lessee to drill a well or to pay delay rental, the
lessor has no election to keep the lease alive or to declare a for-
feiture. He has no control over the matter at all and has no
right which he can enforce against the lessee. He can declare a
forfeiture but the court of equity may relieve against the for-
feiture for mere non-payment of money at the suit of the lessee
with the result that the only effect of this construction is to extend
the lessee's option to drill or to pay. Thus the lessee gets a sub-
stantial benefit from such a construction but the construction is
detrimental to the lessor.
It is submitted that an "unless' lease gives to the lessee the
right to choose any one of three courses. He may drill a well
within the time limited, or he may pay the delay rental from time
to time in lieu of drilling, or he may do neither and allow the
lease to terminate by its own terms.22  He has an option to elect
any one of these three courses. His right neither to drill a well
nor to pay delay rental is as much an option as his right to drill
a well or to pay a sum in lieu of drilling. Ordinarily one having
a definite time within which to exercise an option is not excused
because by his own negligence he failed to exercise his option
within the time fixed,"3 so here the lessee should not be excused
because he negligently fails to give notice of his election to exer-
cise the option to pay. Here the lessee by his express language
made the failure to drill a well or to pay delay rental in lieu
thereof an exercise of his option to allow the lease to terminate
-See TWPANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1412.
"20'Neill %,. Risinger, 77 Kan. 63, 93 Pac. 340 (1908); Curtis v. Harris, 184
Pac. 574 (Okla. 1919); Mitchell v. Probet, 152 Pac. 597 (Okla. 1915).
"An election to exercise an option must ,be within the time stipulated. Time is
of the essence of an option contract. McConkey v. Peach Bottom Slate Co., 68
Fed. 830 (1895) ; Smith -v. ,:Howard, 105 S. W. 411 (Ky. 1907) ; Sage v. Hazard,
6 Barb. 179 (N. Y. 1849); Mitchell v. Probet, 152 Pac. 597 (Okla. 1915); Olsen
v. Northern S. S. Co., 70 ,Wash. 493, 127 Pac. 112 (1912) ; Dyer v. Duffey, 39
W. Va. 148, 19 S. E. 540 (1894). The court in Brunson v,. Carter Oil Co., cited
and relied on a statement in JAmms, OPTION CONTRACTS, § 862, to the effect that
the general rule that options must be exercised within the time fixed is subject
to qualifications and that equity will grant relief to an optionee where "there
is mistake or some other equitable ground for involving its jurisdiction." None
of the cases cited by the author involve the exercise of options or even have dicta
in them on the subject with one exception and the decision in that case is flatly
contra to the author's statement. It is doubtful if this statement in this text
has any foundation whatever.
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1920], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol26/iss2/7
,DITOR IAL NOTES
without the necessity of giving further notice. The lessee loses
nothing for which he has contracted and ought to be compelled to
comply with his obligation. He has paid for the privilege of
keeping the lease alive without drilling for a fixed time and has
the right to pay for a like privilege for an additional period.
When the time paid for has expired the lessee has gotten all he
bargained for, namely, the right to elect which course to take
for a fixed period. He bound himself as to the mode in which he
was to make this election. He made his failure to drill or to pay
in itself an exercise of his option to terminate the lease without
the necessity of giving the lessor notice of his election. Oil and
gas lessees originated "unless" leases so that this very provision
would give them this right to terminate the lease without a cor-
responding liability such as is imposed by the so-called "or" type
of lease. Courts have frequently considered such a lease unfair
to the lessor. Hence it is surprising to find two courts by con-
struction making such a lease still more unfair to the lessor under
pretense of doing equity to the lessee.
In order to reach the result in the cases under consideration
these courts have violated the well-established rule that an oil
and gas lease is to be construed most strongly against the lessee
and in favor of the lessor.14 As shown above, the construction
adopted in these two cases is a strained construction in favor of
the lessee and against the interest of the lessor and is practically
unsupported by authority. If a lessee expressly provides that
delay rental must be paid by a certain day in order to extend the
lease without binding himself to pay it, why should he be given
by a kind and indulgent court more time in which to watch devel-
opments and decide what to do? He has not provided for more
time in the instrument he has had prepared by his own attorneys
and has persuaded the lessor to sign. It is submitted that both
of the decisions are wrong on principle in so far as the facts ap-
pear in the reports.15 The provision which these courts treat as
a condition is intended by the parties to be a special limitation.
No facts upon which an estoppel might be based appear in the
"Schaffer v. Marks, 241 Fed. 139 (D. C., E. D. Okla., 1917); Curtis V. Harris,
supra; Parraflne Oil Co. v. Cruce, 162 Pac. 716 (Okla. 1917); Battman v. Har-
ness, 42 W. Va. 433, 26 S. E. 271 (1896).
IsAttention might be called to a note In the last Issue of this publication where
cases were discussed in which a court extended the term of an oil and gas lease
after a well had been started, by a seemingly strained construction of-the language
of the lease. This construction was also In 'favor of the lessee. See 26 W. VA.
L. Q. 79.
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report of either case. It is submitted that in an "unless" oil and
gas lease nothing should excuse the lessee's failure to pay the
delay rental within the time fixed except some representation or
act of the lessee of a nature to give rise to estoppel. Furthermore,
the lessee has an option to terminate the lease by failure to pay
the delay rental and his failure to exercise his option to pay delay
rental is an exercise of the option to terminate and may be treated
as such by the lessor. The history of the oil and gas business in-
dicates that the lessee does not require a court of equity to pro-
tect him from the effect of disadvantageous leases.
-- J. W. S.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS OF COIITTEE ON PRO-
FESSIONAL ETHICS OF NEW YORK COUNTY
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION'
QUESTION NO. 180
DiwsION or F Es WITH ATTORNEYS FORWARDING COLLECTIONS-
PROPER BASIS INDICATED-RETENTION or SHARE or FEE BY FOR-
WARDING ATTORNEY WITHOUT ACCOUNTING TO CLIENT-NOT NEC-
ESSARLY IMPROPER.-1. An attorney in the course of litigation
is required to engage the services of an out-of-town attorney. This
out-of-town attorney in due course renders his bill for the ser-
vices rendered, upon the prior understanding that the forwarding
attorney is to receive the customary one-third of the fee. The
client could not have procured the services to be rendered by an
out-of-town attorney for a less price than the amount charged. Is
the forwarding attorney entitled to retain for his own use the
share of the fee he receives from his out-of-town corresponding
attorney? 2. Under a similar arrangement for the payment of a
share of the fee to a forwarding attorney, the latter attorney ar-
ranges with his client to condact the entire litigation, including
disbursements, for a fixed amount. In the latter case, would he
.'In answering questions this Committee acts by virtue of the following provisions
of the by-laws of the Association, Article XVI, Section III:
"This Committee shall be empowered when consulted to advise inquirers respecting
questions of proper professional nonduct, reporting its action to the Board of
Directors from time to time."
It Is understood that this Committee acts on specific questions submitted ex Parte,
and in its answers bases its opinion on such facts only as are set forth in the
questions.
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